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Even in the context of neo-classical theory, characterized by a strong trust in the 
virtues of the free market, the need for a policy intervention in the field of 
research and innovation is theorized, because of the presence of market failures. 
In the contemporary context of economic and public finance crisis, on one side 
there is a strong need to boost the industrial productivity through investment in 
research and technology; on the other side the public budget constraints call for 
prudency. In this context the need for systematic evaluations of public incentives 
to firms is particularly strong. In this context, the paper offers an evaluation 
exercise on the major instruments used to promote R&D and innovation 
activities of Italian firms.  
The analysis concentrates in particular on the incentives offered by Law 46/1982 
(and revisions) and their effects on firms expenditures and employment in R&D. 
The Law represents the main national funding program as well as the longest 
lasting single instrument for technology and innovation promotion, although 
revisions of the Law have occurred. In addition to Law 46/1982, Italian firms 
have the chance to benefit from a larger span of public subsidies, particularly at 
the regional and local level. This makes the counterfactual question of “what 
would have happened without the policy” particularly interesting since it is 
likely, and this is confirmed by the data, that firms that do not access to the 
incentives of Law 46/82 benefit from other sources of public financing. 
Therefore it is particularly important to consider the effects of Law 46/82 not just 
in the hypothetical situation of complete absence of policy intervention, but also 
when other similar laws are at work.  
For this reason besides the difference-in-difference estimation, the paper 
analyses the effects of Law 46/1982 through a difference-in-difference-in-
difference model, which allows to verify whether the interaction between 
different kinds of incentives has a multiplicative or a substitutive effect. 
The paper also addresses another typical aspect of evaluation studies: the average 
effect of the policy normally retrieved seems to be not sufficiently informative, 
especially in a country characterized by a marked territorial economic dualism 
(Centre-North vs. South) and by a strong presence of small-medium firms, with 
profoundly different characteristics from large firms. In other words the effects 
of the policy instrument might vary substantially among firms. Therefore the 
paper takes explicitly into consideration the different effect of the incentives on 
different sectors (according to Pavitt classification), on different size of firms and 
in different zones of the country. The database used for the analysis is the 
Capitalia Survey (former Mediocredito Centrale). Data are obtained from three 







Modern economies, even when based on a free-market 
organization, make use of public intervention for several purposes. 
Mainstream economic literature traditionally justifies such 
intervention with the market failure argument. Other strands of 
literature, describing the developmental state, signal the use of 
industrial development policies for strategic objectives. The recent 
economic crisis has somehow blurred the borders of such a 
distinction and policy intervention seems to be greatly welcomed 
by industrialized economies as well as by emerging markets. 
However, the international scenarios opened by the crisis are 
largely uncertain and unknown and this offers an opportunity for 
governments to rethink their industrial development policies as 
well as the structures of their economies, which in many cases have 
contributed to the upsurge of the crisis. In this context, the research 
on policy evaluation, viewed as both an institutional practice and as 
a coherent set of techniques, becomes fundamental. Too often 
policy evaluation is studied and developed within academic 
circuits, with few linkages with policy makers and scarce effects on 
voters’ choices (Barbieri and Santarelli, 2010; Barbieri, 2010), 
whereas policy evaluation can offer important solutions to the 
government failure dilemma.  
The word “evaluation” means different things in different contexts 
and although the literature normally refers to it as a “judgement on 
the effects” of a policy (Shadish et al., 1991) there is no consensus 
on the comparison term that should be used to measure such 
effects. They are often investigated with reference to predefined 
objectives, standards or other countries’ experiences. However, it is 
worth recalling that the diffusion of policy evaluation is in many 
ways linked to the experience of the U.S. social experiments of the 
‘60s and ‘70s and to the idea of “counterfactual situation” (see 
                                                 
1 This paper is the result of a strict collaboration among the authors. Anyway 
sections 1, 3, 6.1 and 6.2  may be mainly attributed to Elisa Barbieri; sections 2, 
4 and 7.1 to Roberto Iorio; sections 5, 6.3 and 7 (except 7.1) to Giuseppe 
Lubrano Lavadera. Conclusions have been jointly written. 
among others Katz, 1998; Haveman, 1987). When talking about ex-
post evaluation the question “what would have happened without 
policy intervention?” is crucial. Social experiments, statistic and 
econometric techniques of the so-called quasi-experiments and 
interviews to the beneficiaries of policy interventions are 
traditionally three ways to address this question. Quasi-experiments 
have increasingly gained consensus within policy evaluation as a 
scientific reference method to carry out policy evaluation when 
social experiments are not feasible. As it can be argued (see among 
others Smith, 2004) quasi-experiments have limitations: sometimes 
the counterfactual situation is just impossible to identify, or the 
combination of available data with conventional statistic and 
econometric tools implies unrealistic assumptions. Moreover, ex-
post policy evaluation and the counterfactual estimation is often 
carried out as a separate activity from process evaluation (and by 
different actors); as a result quasi-experimental analyses tend to 
conclude that policies are effective or ineffective, without being 
able to explain why. Although these can be arguments against the 
quasi-experimental approaches, the question of what would happen 
without policy intervention remains crucial and this paper wishes to 
stress the need for research to move forward in this direction, 
looking for ways to take into account the numerous complexities 
that policy intervention implies.  
In this scenario and with this aim, the research presented in this 
paper investigates the effects of the Italian law n.46/1982 (with its 
subsequent transformations), which regulates the major incentive 
programs that are used to support the Research and Development 
(R&D) and innovation of Italian firms (Ministero dello Sviluppo 
Economico, 2009). In particular, we study the effects of these 
incentives on firms’ R&D expenditures and on the number of 
workers in R&D. To this aim we refer to a consolidated and diffuse 
methodology: the difference in difference technique (DD). We also 
utilize a less diffuse form of such an approach (difference in 
difference in difference, DDD) in order to take into account that 
firms might receive from the national and the regional governments 
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other incentives for their R&D activities, in addition to those of law 
46/1982. Moreover we investigate the effects of Law 46/1982 for 
homogeneous sub-groups of firms with the aim to deepen our 
knowledge on the specific kind of firms that benefit the most from 
this policy intervention. Our results seem to point at an inefficient 
overlapping of instruments aiming at similar goals. A positive 
effect of the law seems to emerge for large firms, although a deeper 
look at the specific manufacturing sectors suggests that the specific 
industrial production needs to be taken into account. We also take 
explicitly into consideration the different effect of the incentives in 
different zones of the country. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 recalls the main 
theoretical considerations on R&D and innovation policies; section 
3 summarizes the debate on the effects of subsidies to R&D; in the 
fourth section the main features of Law 46/1982 are described with 
reference to the Italian scenario; section 5 describes the data used 
in the estimates, whereas section 6 explains the econometric 
strategy applied. The seventh section discusses the results and the 
eighth concludes.  
2. Theoretical considerations on R&D and innovation 
incentives 
The theoretical reasons why public intervention is needed when 
speaking of innovation have been long since established. The 
traditional conceptual framework belongs to the neoclassical 
approach; then an articulated evolutionary approach to the problem 
has been also developed. 
The seminal contribution belongs to Arrow (1962), who underlines 
the non-perfect appropriability of knowledge and the need for 
government intervention to avoid an underinvestment in R&D by 
private actors. Patents, as known, are the fundamental policy 
instruments to obtain this result, assuring a full, even though 
temporary, appropriability of the results of inventions and 
innovations. Nevertheless, the large part of innovation that is not 
patented implies that the existence of a patenting system cannot 
completely overcome the problem of underinvestment in research. 
Therefore other instruments of public intervention are frequently 
adopted, particularly monetary subsidies (in the form of tax relief 
or lower interest rates). From a theoretical point of view the 
effectiveness of such tools is not assured: the additionality is not 
guaranteed. Additionality, that is a key point in evaluating a public 
intervention, means that a firm which benefits from a public 
subsidy in a general sense does more and better than it would have 
done without the intervention. We use such a generic definition 
because different kinds of additionality may be identified: 
following Georghiou (2002) we may identify an input additionality, 
an output additionality and a behavioural additionality. There is 
input additionality if the firm, receiving the incentive, spends an 
amount of money in input of innovation (typically R&D) greater 
then it what would have spent in absence of such incentive. 
Properly, there is no input additionality if the increase is smaller 
than the subsidy. Input additionality is not verified also when the 
firm accepts the subsidy for an activity that it would have carried 
out anyway and the internal resources that would have been 
destined to such project are invested in another project. The 
Nordhaus’ model (1969) identifies this problem, predicting that a 
profit maximising firm invests in R&D up to the level where 
expected costs are equal to expected returns of the project: a public 
subsidy may induce the firm to undertake “inframarginal”, 
therefore not efficient, projects (whose expected costs exceeds 
benefits). It is particularly difficult to investigate this second kind 
of input additionality, as it is not easy at all to investigate the 
“intention” of firms, or the real expected costs and return of the 
possible research projects. 
The second kind of additionality is the output additionality, that is 
verified when firms obtain an innovative output (product or 
process) that would not have been realised without the public 
support. Since an innovation is the result of a complex interaction 
of several factors, that takes place through non-deterministic paths 
and not exactly determined time profiles, it is extremely difficult to 
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establish if a specific innovation is the results or not of a particular 
intervention.  
With the third kind of additionality, the behavioural additionality, 
we move towards the evolutionary approach to innovation. In such 
a theoretical context an innovation policy may change the 
behaviour of the firm, specifically in the way a project is carried 
out: not only some “objective” decisions may change (a change in 
the scale, scope and timing of the firm activity is possible) but there 
can be also permanent changes at the strategic level (e.g. the firm 
moves into new areas of activity), at the level of acquired 
competences and, more deeply, there may be what Bach and Matt 
(2002) call cognitive capacity additionality. This kind of changes 
are particularly significant in the long run, therefore it is more 
difficult to measure them, especially if a criterion of comparison 
between resources and results is adopted. 
The importance of each of the three kinds of additionality is 
evident, but we underlined the difficulties associated to the 
evaluation of output and behavioural additionality. This is the 
reason why, at this stage, we focus on the input additionality, in the 
sense that we try to verify if firms which have received the 
incentives established in Law n.46/1982 have increased their R&D 
expenditure and personnel, with respect to a hypothetic situation 
where such public intervention is absent. 
Our paper also deals with a less traditional theme: the evaluation of 
the effects of a specific incentive in the presence of other incentives 
directed to similar goals. In fact the presence of multiple incentives, 
that is, as we will see, a characteristic of the Italian policy to 
sustain innovation, creates theoretical and practical problems when 
trying to evaluate the effect of a specific incentive. 
If an incentive A has typically an effect X and an incentive B has 
typically an effect Y, a firm that receives both incentives may 
simply have an effect X+Y. But there are many reasons to 
hypothesize that the effect is less than X+Y and other good reasons 
to suppose that the effect is more than X+Y. 
The first case may for instance happen if there is an overlapping of 
the two incentives, that is of the fields or kind of projects that they 
may finance; in such a case part of the projects of the firm may be 
covered de facto by two incentives: we only have partial 
additionality. The second case may for instance happen if there is a 
behavioural additionality. With the first incentive the firm tries to 
do something it would not have done without it; then the firm 
learns to do that kind of research: the incentive has the “normal” 
effect X plus “something else” (in terms of experience). This 
“surplus” allows the firm to obtain more than the “normal” benefit  
(Y) if it utilises a second incentive (B). Indeed, a third case is 
actually possible: if a firm receives the incentive A alone, the effect 
is X, when the firm receives the two incentives together, the effect 
is minus than X; if this happens it is a sign of a severe distortion in 
the system of incentives. 
3. The debate on the effects of subsidies to R&D and innovation 
The literature on the evaluation of the effects of public subsidies on 
firms’ innovation activities is extremely wide. However, there are 
several thorough reviews that help synthesize the main features of 
the studies available on the topic (see in particular David et al., 
2000 and Klette et al., 2000).  
What emerges immediately from a first look to such literature is 
that most of the available studies measure the effects of public 
incentives on firms’ R&D expenditures. In other words they 
question the degree of substitutability or complementarity between 
private and public investment in R&D and they choose to use, as a 
measure of the outcome, the variable that determines innovation 
(R&D expenditures) instead of innovation itself (Griliches, 1990). 
As already mentioned, one of the reasons of such a preference is 
that the causal relationship between public incentives and 
expenditures in R&D is easier to track than the one between 
incentives and the final innovation performance of the firm. In this 
latter case many variables other than incentives have an influence 
on the firm’s innovation capacity and the causal chain between 
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incentives and innovation is longer and more difficult to establish. 
However, investigating the relation between government incentives 
and firms’ spending is also a necessary first step to understand the 
effectiveness of R&D policies over innovation results.  
A number of studies that go beyond the estimation of the input 
additionality take into account the effect of publicly supported 
research on: growth in sales (Lerner, 1999), labour productivity 
(Griliches and Regev, 1998), total factor productivity Klette and 
Moen (1999), patents (Narin et al., 1997), R&D employment 
(Wolff and Reinthaler, 2008).  
Within the available studies, in particular as regards input 
additionality, one can distinguish according to the type of data 
used, the method and the level of analysis. There are studies using 
cross-section data (among others Wallsten, 2000; Busom, 2000; 
Antonelli, 1989; Lichtenberg, 1984; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003), 
time-series data (particularly in aggregated analysis, see Levy and 
Terleckyj, 1983; Lichtenberg, 1987) and panel data (Lichtenberg, 
1987, 1988; Toinovanen and Niininen, 1998; Lach, 2000). The 
methods used are typical of the quasi-experiment approach and 
range from multiple regressions with different estimation methods 
to matching methods and the use of instrumental variables, 
according to the type of data available and to the type of bias that 
needs to be taken into account. Finally, according to the unit of 
analysis, there are firm level studies (Wallsten, 2000; Busom, 2000; 
Antonelli, 1989; Lichtenberg, 1984; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; 
Lichtenberg, 1987, 1988; Toinovanen and Niininen, 1998; Lach, 
2000), industry-level studies (Lichtenberg, 1984; Levin and Reiss, 
1984; Goldberg, 1979 to name some) and macro analyses at the 
country level (among others Diamond, 1998; Von Tunzelmann and 
Martin, 1998; Levy, 1990).  
These researches, as noted also by Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), 
seem to point at a general positive effect of the public investment 
on private R&D expenditures, thus suggesting a complementarity 
between the two, at least at the country and industry level. 
However, when going into the details of firm-level studies the 
results are not homogeneous. We have no priors concerning the 
effects of public incentives to R&D since the empirical evidence 
suggests that it is the single instrument, the way it is designed and 
implemented and the specific context where it is adopted that 
determine a positive or a negative (or null) effect.  
As regards the fewer studies available on other outcome variables, 
Lerner (1999) finds a limited positive impact on the growth of sales 
and employment in the U.S.; Griliches and Regev (1998) find a 
positive impact on labour productivity in Israel, while Klette and 
Moen (1999) in a study on Norway conclude for a negative impact 
on total factor productivity, probably, they explain, due to a 
government selection, at that particular time, of large firms that 
were experiencing problems after the restructuring of the IT sector 
at the end of the 80s. Narin et al. (1997) discover a strong relation 
between publicly funded research programmes and industrial 
patents in the U.S., and Wolff and Reinthaler (2008) find a limited 
effect of public subsidies on R&D employment, but a stronger 
effect on R&D expenditures in several OECD countries which, 
they point out, might suggest an increase in the wages of scientists. 
Coming to the effect of the specific law 46 that we are 
investigating, a first study on the effect of FAR (Fund for Applied 
Research, which is regulated by art. 1-13 of the law) was produced 
by Merito et al. (2007) with matching procedures on a different 
database (Ministry of University and Research, Amadeus-Bureau 
van Dijk and Delphion-Thomson). The results do not show any 
positive effect of the law on sales, employment or labour 
productivity, while they suggest a short term effect on patent 
applications. A second contribution by Potì and Cerulli (2010) 
(with data from Ministry of University and Research and Italian 
National Institute of Statistics) finds that FAR has stimulated 
additional investment in R&D and better innovation performances 
(measured by patents). These results refer in particular to large 
firms. The second part of the law (art. 14-19 which regulate the FIT 
– Fund for Technological Innovation) has also been object of a few 
studies: De Blasio et al. (2009) re-create a natural experiment 
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thanks to an unexpected shortage of funds and conclude that there 
are no effects on firms’ tangible and intangible asset investment. 
The Ministry of Economic Development, on the other hand, 
following a qualitative approach with direct interviews to the 
beneficiaries concludes that the FIT produces additional 
investment, with 65% of the firms declaring that without the 
incentives they wither would not have invested or they would have 
invested less than observed (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 
2008).   
4. Law 46/1982 in the Italian scenario   
The Italian economy is characterised by a low level of private 
investment in R&D (40% of the total) if compared to that (70%) of 
other European countries (Sweden, Germany, Finland, Ireland and 
Spain). Moreover R&D incentives only represent 13% of 
government incentives, compared to 15% of Germany, 16% of 
Spain and 23% of France (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 
2009).  
Among R&D government incentives to firms, Law 46/1982 is the 
longest lasting and most important policy measure in Italy 
(Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2008). It is directed 
particularly to research intensive geographical and manufacturing 
areas and sectors. It therefore offers benefits in particular to large 
firms in Northern Italy, in high-tech sectors and specialised in the 
development of large research projects (Ministero dello Sviluppo 
Economico, 2009). 
Two different parts can be distinguished within the Law, the first 
one concerning art.1-13, the second one art.14-19.  
The first part of the Law (art.1-13) regulates the special Fund for 
Applied Research, originally established with Law n.1089/1968. 
The focus of art. 1-13 is particularly on applied research, on 
technology transfer to the medium and small enterprises and on 
research collaborations between the public and the private sector2. 
                                                 
2The financed research must be conducted in external public or private laboratories, 
authorised by the government. 
Up to 50% of the costs of the projects may be covered by such 
fund. The second part of the Law (art.14-19) creates the Fund for 
Technological Innovation. According to the Law’s words, this fund 
has the goal to “finance programs concerning activities of planning, 
experimentation, development and pre-industrialization”. Under 
this fund firms receive financial support at a cut rate, up to a period 
of fifteen years.  
Some measures are exclusively dedicated to small and medium 
firms, like actions of technology transfer and under several aspects 
the law assures favourable conditions to this kind of firms (lower 
interest rates, dedicated funds, etc.). 
Several other funding programs were in force at a national level, 
but the Legislative Decree n.297/1999 (which became effective in 
2001) unified several of these programs3 in a unique Fund to 
Facilitate Research (FAR). It also absorbed the Fund for Applied 
Research established by the first part of the law 46/1982. 
Therefore, to be precise, in evaluating the effect of the first part of 
the law 46/1982, we must consider that the fund established in 
accordance to such a Law became part of a wider fund. 
Notwithstanding this legislative simplification, Italian firms 
continue to have the chance to benefit from a lot of public 
subsidies, particularly at the local level; this peculiarity of the 
Italian system increased in the last decade as a consequence of a 
significant process of legislative decentralization, particularly in 
favour of the Regions (MET, 2005). 
It is important to spend a few words on the selection procedures of 
the benefited firms,. As regards the Fund to Facilitate the Research 
(FAR), the demand must be directed to the competent Ministry 
(Ministry of University and Research), then three kinds of 
procedures are possible: evaluative, negotiation and automatic4.  
                                                 
3 Precisely: law 46/1982; law 488/1992 (the part concerning research); law 346/1988; law 
196/1997 (art.14); law 449/1997 (art.5). 
4 In illustrating the three procedures we followed a web page of the site of the Ministry of 
University and Research (http://www.miur.it/0003Ricerc/0139FAR_-
_/0159Il_nuo/index_cf3.htm), which makes a comment to the Ministerial Decree 
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In the first case a specific committee evaluates the projects of the 
applicant firm; some criteria are expressly required and verified by 
the committee: innovative character, originality and industrial 
utility of the project on one side, technical and economic capacity 
to carry out the project on the other side. It is interesting to notice 
that the additionality criterion is expressly required only for large 
firms, in line with the EU regulation5. 
The negotiation procedure regards public competitions for projects 
of R&D and training: the ministry individuates specific thematic 
areas of intervention and modalities of provision of the incentive 
and selects the best projects. This is a typical top-down form of 
public intervention. 
The evaluation phase of the projects is completely overcome with 
the automatic procedure of intervention: when a firm carries out 
some specific activities (hiring of qualified research personnel, 
provision of scholarships for Ph.D. students, assignments of 
specific research contracts) it may apply for some established 
forms of funding, that will be automatically granted, according to 
the chronological order of the demands, up to a pre-defined budget 
limit. 
These selection procedures were similar even before the reform 
that introduced the FAR (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 
2005, p.15) and throughout the reform the majority of financed 
firms access the government incentives through the evaluative 
procedure, although before the reform no specific mention was 
made to the requirement of additionality (Ministero dello Sviluppo 
Economico, 2002; 2009).  
As regards the second part (art.14-21) of the Law, the demand and 
the project must be directed to the competent Ministry (Ministry of 
                                                                                                              
n.593/2000; this decree made the Legislative decree n.297/1999 effective, substituting the 
first part (art.1-13) of the law n.46/1982.  
5 Large firms are all the firms that do not meet at least one of the criteria to be defined as 
small-medium enterprises (SEMs). SMEs in turn are defined according to these three 
criteria: number of employees lower than 250 employees; annual revenues not exceeding 
40 million Euros; no ownership control by a large firm exceeding 25% of the capital. 
Industry), then a procedure of “investigation” begins, in order to 
establish if the firm can obtain the required financial support. 
It must be observed that there is no reference to the theme of 
additionality. Nevertheless, the financed firms must declare that 
they are not benefiting from other specific public funds for 
programs with the same object and goals6. Another remarkable 
aspect is the existence of a verification procedure, with a system of 
penalties: if a funded firm does not realize the program, the funding 
may be interrupted and the firms may be forced to return the 
received funding.  
Summing up, we found that the theme of additionality, which is 
central in the theoretical analysis of the public funding for 
innovation, is rarely expressly considered in the laws we are 
analysing. Such laws try to avoid the worst problems (the same 
project financed by two or more public funds; failure to realize the 
financed projects), being more pragmatic on the possibility that the 
firm would have carried out the project even without the public 
sustain.  
With the automatic procedure there is a clear risk of non-
additionality, but it is faster and not biased against weaker firms, 
that have in general fewer chances to get through the evaluation. 
Some studies done by the Ministry of Economic Development in 
2008 (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2008) confirmed these 
considerations: an high percentage of firms that utilised the 
automatic incentives would have anyway done the same actions, 
even in the absence of the public support; this percentage is much 
lower when the evaluation procedure is involved; on the other side, 
the automatic procedure have been greatly appreciated, particularly 
by small firms, exactly because they are easy to access, while the 
main complaint against the evaluation procedure is its length.    
                                                 
6 Precisely: law n.1089/1968; law n.675/1977. 
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5. Data and summary statistics  
The database used for the analysis is composed by the 7th, 8th and 
9th waves of data gathering of Capitalia Survey7  (former 
Mediocredito Centrale) on manufacturing firms with more than 10 
employees. Each wave includes about 4500 observations: these are 
extracted in a stratified sample for firms with less than 500 
workers, whereas they cover all Italian firms with more than 500 
employees. Each wave refers to a period of three years, 
respectively 1995-1997, 1998-2000 and 2001-2003. Questionnaires 
were kept very similar among the waves to ensure comparability 
and they are equal in the parts that are relevant to this study. The 
stratified sampling has been realised to cover macro-regions 
(North-East, North-West, Centre, South), dimensions (11-20, 21-
50, 51-250, 251-500, more than 500 employees) and Pavitt 
classification (Supplier-Dominated, Scale-Intensive, Specialised 
Suppliers and Science-Based). Each stratum has been determined 
following the Neyman's formula, in order to be representative of 
the whole population.  
The database that results from the merger of the three waves is 
composed by more than 13000 observations. Within this database, 
a balanced panel of more than 600 firms can be observed across the 
three waves (see table 1) and two balanced panels, one of 1316 
firms and the other of 2127 firms, cane be observed respectively 
between the 7th and 8th waves and between 8th and 9th waves. There 
is high attrition (i.e. loss of data across different waves) in the 
sample, as O'Higgins and Nese (2007) noted, which can potentially 
result in an attrition bias in the regression estimates. Appropriate 
tests on the variables as in Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and 
Wooldridge (2002) have been introduced in the analysis (see 
section 7) to deal with this aspect.   
The Capitalia dataset is composed mainly by small and medium 
firms, in line with the structure of the Italian productive system. 
Large firms represent only about 10% of the sample (Table 1). 
                                                 
7Centro Studi Capitalia (1998, 2001, 2004). 
Enterprises that are part of a group are 20% to 30% of the sample. 
This is a relevant portion of the sample and it  is mainly due to the 
definition of “group” used: it is in fact a broad definition that 
covers all firms that have any kind of property link with another 
company. The Pavitt classification was preferred to others because 
it distinguishes enterprise specialization without splitting the 
sample into excessively minute sub-samples. Moreover, it is 
relevant to analyse the effect of incentives on R&D for firms that 
employ different levels of technology. Most firms in the sample 
belong to the Pavitt 1 category (supplier-dominated), whereas the 
percentage of science-based firms represents only a minor part of 
the survey, about 5% (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Number of oservations and percentage of sub-groups of observations 












Observations 4497 4680 4284 1316 2127 663 
Big Firms 10.52 6.77 11.37 8.61 8.97 9,49 
Part of a Group 24.88 20.34 32.33 22.57 26,07 25,67 
Pavitt1 Supplier-Dominated  44.07 52.78 51.96 52.39 48,51 49,61 
Pavitt2 Scale-Intensive 24.86 17.84 16.81 21.10 17,16 19,73 
Pavitt3SpecialisedSuppliers 26,46 24,10 26,68 25,26 25,33 25,71 
Pavitt4 Science-based  4.60 5.64 4.55 5.13 5,12 4,95 
The first line shows the number of firms composing the balanced sample. Other lines are 
all percentage calculated on rotation sample (rotation sample compositions are the sum of 
the waves).  
  
The Capitalia database contains information on both firm 
characteristics and incentives received. On the one hand, it is 
possible to know if firms are part of a group, their R&D expense, 
how they finance investments and the number of workers in R&D. 
On the other, the database distinguishes between different 
typologies of incentives to foster R&D and between the two parts 
of Law 46/82. This bulk of information in Capitalia Survey is a 
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unique instrument for the evaluation of law 46/82 and other R&D 
incentives. 
The percentage of firms that received any R&D incentive 
(including Law 46/82) in the survey increased from 11% to 20% in 
the three waves (Table 2, first line). Specifically, the number of 
firms receiving an incentive under Law 46/82 is not so wide: 
incentives under the first part of the Law are granted to about 2% 
of the firms, whereas the second part of the Law benefits more than 
3% of the firms. Even if the number of firms receiving incentives 
under Law 46/82 is scant, most of them obtain at least another 
R&D incentive, as it is displayed in the last three rows of Table 2. 
The combination of different incentives stimulating the same firms 
can mislead the evaluation of law 46/82 (and its parts) and needs to 
be taken into account.  
 
Table 2. Percentage of granted firms  












% Received a law for R&D 11.32 14.94 19.79 13.16 17,26 15,27 
% Received Law 46/82 4.47 5.47 11.11 4.98 8,17 6,93 
% Received Law 46/82 first 
part 
2.22 2.31 1.54 2.27 1,94 2,04 
% Received Law 46/82 
second  part 
3.34 4.29 10.20 3.82 7,12 5,85 
% Received Law 46/82 and 
other law for R&D 
62.69 66.41 40.55 65.77 49,59 52,41 
% Received Law 46/82 first 
part and other law for R&D 
89 88.89 74.24 88.94 83,33 85,40 
% Received Law 46/82 
second  part and other law 
for R&D 
64.67 68.16 41.65 66.67 50 52,79 
All lines are percentage calculated on rotation sample (rotation sample compositions are 





6. Econometric Analysis 
6.1. Methodology 
The advantage of having repeated observations over time for 
each of the unit of analysis is that one can observe the behaviour of 
firms that did not have any incentive and then received it at some 
point in time, and compare it with that of firms that never received 
the incentive.  
In doing this we recall that the main issues to take into account 
are (1) the selection bias; (2) endogeneity, stemming possibly from 
reverse causality or from the presence of omitted latent variables 
that influence both the private and the public investment decisions. 
More precisely: 
- firms that receive the subsidy, as already said, are not a 
random selection of potential beneficiaries, on the contrary they 
might be the result of a self-selection process: firms that are more 
“active” in R&D and innovation might have more information on 
the available subsidies (deadlines, procedures alternative incentives 
etc.) and might have higher technical competencies and expertise to 
submit the applications. Their innovation performance might be 
higher than that of firms that did not apply for the subsidy, but this 
could be the results of the above mentioned factors instead of the 
public incentive; 
- even if self-selection is taken into consideration, it is quite 
unlikely that the public decision to finance R&D and innovation 
activities trough subsidies is completely independent from the 
firm’s previous R&D and innovation records. In other words, the 
decision to offer a subsidy might be influenced by and at the same 
time might determine how “innovative” a firm is. The choice by 
government is non random and in most cases it reflects a “picking 
the winner” strategy. Related to the above-mentioned issues it is 
the more general idea that there might be observable or 
unobservable factors that influence simultaneously the private and 
public investment decisions (David et al., 2000).  
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In this study we refer to the “difference in difference” approach as 
an instrument to take into account possible biases due to the non 
random selection of beneficiaries (Heckman, 1998; David et al., 
2000; Klette et al., 2000)8. In particular, given the nature of our 
data, we use the DD estimator in the fixed effect form as in Imbens 
and Wooldridge (2009)9. Difference-in-differences estimators have 
been used widely in policy evaluation since Ashenfelter and Card 
(1985). The analysis is carried out over two consecutive time 
periods (each period covers three years) and the beneficiaries are 
firms that received the incentive in the second period but not in the 
first one10. We do not take into account therefore firms that 
received the incentive in the first period, because these potentially 
incorporate already an effect of the incentive on R&D 
expenditures. In this approach the selection mechanism for 
receiving the subsidy is allowed to be dependent on time-invariant 
unobserved characteristics. The usual example is of subsidised 
individuals, or firms in our case, that are “more able” or “more 
motivated” to take part to the program than excluded firms, 
provided that such an advantage affects their outcome in every 
period in the same way. In the context of firms incentives to R&D, 
several analyses have chosen the DD method of estimation to take 
into account the selection on unobservables above mentioned (see 
for instance Lichtenberg, 1984 and 1988; Holemans and 
Sleuwaegen, 1988). The use of the fixed effect form also allows to 
control for possible heterogeneities of the beneficiaries, meaning 
                                                 
8 The DD model can be applied if at least two observation (before and after the policy 
intervention) are available for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the incentive 
program. In the standard form Yi,t Pi TtPiTti,tYi,t is 
the outcome variable, Pi  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firms i is part of the 
beneficiaries and 0 otherwise, Tt is also a dummy variable equal to 1 only in the second 
period (after the policy program begins) and 0 otherwise. The true “treatment variable” is  
PiTt  that is equal to 1 only for firms that received the incentives at the time of policy 
intervention. The coefficient  therefore estimates the effect of the policy. For further 
details see also among others Smith (2004).  
9 For further reference see also Blundell et al. (2007) and Wooldridge (2007). 
10 Alternatively we could have run the regression on the three periods, but in this case we 
would assume a constant effect of the law throughout nine years, which seemed to us 
unrealistic Bertrand et al (2004).   
other individual effects depending on time-invariant firms 
characteristics (such as geographical location and industrial sector). 
Moreover, we add other control variables in the model in order to 
capture effects that cannot be refereed to the single firm and 
differences in the growth trend of beneficiary firms and non 
beneficiary ones.  The main limit of such an approach, beyond the 
assumption of fixed effects, is that it is dependent from the 
functional form that the evaluator chooses to specify11.    
The estimation of the effects of Law 46/82 is carried out on both 
R&D expenditures and on R&D employment, analysing the Law as 
a whole as well as its two different components (FAR and FIT). 
The DD estimations take the following form: 
 
(1)R&Dexpendituresit=α+β1Wavet+β2Law46/82it+Zitγ+ci+ uit           
    
 
(2)R&Demploymentit=α+β1Wavet+β2Law46/82it + Zitγ+ci + uit 
 
 
In the above specified equations β1 captures the time effect; β2 is the 
DD estimator that captures the effect of the policy, the variable 
Law46/82it, in fact, is equal to 1 when firm i receives the incentive 
at wave t. The variable Zit summarizes all controls; further details 
on the variables and the way they are calculated can be found in 
table 6.1. 
6.2 Aspects of multiple treatment and heterogeneity 
The above specified equations allow to compute an average 
effect of the policy on the beneficiaries of Law 46/82. However, 
there still are a number of crucial issues that are missed in the 
estimations of equations 6.1. and 6.2.  
First of all, as mentioned in a previous work by the authors 
                                                 
11  Non parametric, matching methods for instance, do not suffer from this limit. 
Although they are only able to deal with a selection mechanism based on observable 
variables. For further details see Abadie (2002), Dehejia and Wahba (1999) 
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(2010) there is a need to take into account the possible scenario 
where firms receive more than one incentive, by different 
government sources and authorities. As shown in section 5 this is 
indeed a common scenario. The counterfactual situation for non 
beneficiaries of Law 46/82 is seldom “a complete absence of 
incentives”, but it is rather likely (and it is the case in Italy) that 
firms face a choice among many different incentives (at the 
national and regional level), so that many firms will benefit from 
other R&D incentives in addition to Law 46/82, while other firms 
will have only one of this options and still other firms will have 
none. As it is discussed in the result section 7 when other R&D 
incentives are included in the analysis the results change 
substantially.  
Secondly, DD conventional estimation returns, as said, an 
average effect that is equal for all firms. In other words it does not 
allow to take into account the possibility that effects are 
heterogeneous among firms or group of firms (ex. large vs. small 
firms, high tech vs. low tech and so forth). Despite homogeneity 
being in some cases a very strict assumption, the so called ATET 
(average treatment effect on the treated) is by far the most used 
estimator in the analyses on R&D incentives. Analyses that produce 
as a result an average effect on beneficiaries can be little helpful to 
policy makers (and to firms and workers) since they tend to either 
accept the incentives as they are, or (much more often) to suggest 
that incentives should be fully abandoned. In this way little room is 
left for improvements and rationalisation.. Heterogeneity and 
multiple treatments can imply complex models of estimation 
(Smith, 2004) which often discourage a diffuse debate on these 
aspects. In this paper we provide a contribution in this direction by 
including in the analysis other incentives in R&D and by estimating 
the effect of Law 46/82 for subgroups of firms.  
In particular, in order to take into account other R&D incentives 
we calculate the DDD (difference in difference in differences) 
estimator (Wooldridge, 2007; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). To 
this aim, a new variable is created (R&D incentives) to identify 
firms that received other R&D incentives12, different from those 
offered by law 46/82.  Equations 3 and 4 provide the details of the 
DDD estimation: 
 
(3)R&Dexpendituresit = +β1Wavet+β2Law46/82it 
+β3OtherR&Dincentives it+ + β4DDD Estimator+ Ziγ+ci+uit         
      
 
(4)R&Demploymentit=α+β1Wavet+β2Law46/82it+β3OtherR&Dince
ntivesit + +β4DDDEstimator+Ziγ+ci+uit         
 
 
The coefficient β1 captures the time effect, β2 measures the 
effect of law 46, β3 highlights the effect of all other laws that 
encourage R&D (other than law 46/82) and finally β4 shows the 
combined effect of other R&D incentives and law 46/82 (Barbieri 
et al., 2010). Details of the new variables can also be found in table 
6.1. 
6.3 Variables description  
The relevant dependent variables are, as mentioned, the logarithms 
of expenditures in R&D (R&D expenditures) and the logarithms of 
number of workers within the R&D sector (R&D employment).  
Given that the database allows to distinguish the two parts of Law 
46, regressions look at the whole effect of Law 46 as well as at the 
distinct effects of the Fund for Applied Research and the Fund for 
Technological Innovation. All control variables are provided by the 
Capitalia database, except for the number of bank branches in the 
firm’s town of residence, which is provided by the Bank of Italy 13. 
Control variables were introduced for two specific reasons. On the 
one hand, they allow to take into account some relevant 
confounding factors: first of all firms’ size (Workers and 
                                                 
12 Among these are law 166/02, law 30/84, law 140/97 and other (non specified) regional 




Log_Sales) that affects the ability to manage R&D and that 
captures the effects of macroeconomic cycles or shocks; secondly, 
the participation to consortia that represents an alternative channel 
for small companies to foster R&D (R&DConsortia). On the other 
hand, incentives work as an alternative method of financing. Firms 
with reduced capacity of interactions with banks can have more 
difficulties in finding sources to invest in R&D and this justifies 
controlling for a few financial indicators  (Self-financing in R&D 
and Bank branches).  
 
The variable Law 46/82 has different specifications depending on 
whether it is analysed as a whole or in its two parts, and on the 
considered period of observation. The term “Law46/82” has de 
facto six different specifications that are explained in detail in table 
A.1 of the appendix. To simplify the reading of the results, all these 
specifications take the same name in the regression tables. 
The variable referring to other R&D incentives is defined in a 
similar way and details can also be found in table A.1 (appendix). 
The last policy variable (DDD estimator) is the product of Law 
48/82 and other R&D incentives and it represents the cross effect 
of the different R&D policies. 
7. Results  
Before commenting on the results, a few remarks on the 
specification tests carried out in the analysis are mandatory. Data 
description in section 5 has shown possible biases in the results 
coming from a possible attrition problem in the data. The Verbeek 
and Nijman test14 has been used to control for this possibility and it 
shows that the loss of observations that we detect is not dependent 
from any variable in the regressions, but it is rather due to causal 
factors. We can therefore exclude the presence of attrition bias. The 
                                                 
14 Verbeek and Nijman (1992) cited in Wooldridge (2002). The dummy variable nextwave 
was created. Its value is equal to 1 if an observation is also present in the following wave. 
With a simple t-test, we test the hypothesis that P(Y|Nextwave,X) = P(Y|X). If the 
hypothesis is verified then the loss of observation is not related to variables in the 
regression but it is probably due to causality.  
results of the attrition test are displayed in the regression tables (see 
appendix). Regressions are also run taking into account 
heteroskedasticity, which is corrected through robust estimations15.  
The results of the difference in difference estimation (table A.2 of 
the appendix) show a general positive effect of the Law on both 
R&D expenditures and R&D employment. However, only a few 
cases satisfy the conventional significance threshold (90%) that 
excludes the possibility of a null or even negative effect. In 
particular, the first part of the Law appears to have positive and 
significant effects on R&D expenditures, but only in the first period 
of observation. On the other hand, the second part of the Law 
displays positive and significant effects on R&D employment, but 
again only in the first period of observation (waves 7 and 8).  
When moving onto the DDD estimations, where other R&D 
incentives are taken into account, the results change considerably 
(table A.3 of the appendix). In particular, whereas the other R&D 
incentives always display positive and significant results, the 
effects of Law 46/82 loose significance in all the different 
specifications and periods of observation. Moreover, although 
never significant, the DDD estimator always appears with a 
negative sign. These results confirm that multiple treatment is an 
issue that needs to be carefully investigated: in this case it appears 
that the first positive effects of the Law detected in the DD 
estimation were in fact due to other R&D incentives and that there 
might be an inefficient overlapping of instruments to support R&D 
investments.  
In addition, the DDD estimation returns an average effect that is 
equal for all kinds of firms. As already mentioned the homogeneity 
of effects is probably an unrealistic assumption in this case and it is 
worth looking at subgroups of firms that share similar 
characteristics. The idea is to have a clearer picture of the type of 
firm that might benefit the most from FAR and FIT.  Tables A.4 and 
                                                 
15 This correction is made through the cluster method, which takes into account aggregate 
variables in the individual (single firm) estimations. A simple robust estimator in fact can 
under-estimate the error as noted by Moulton (1990).  
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A.5 of the appendix provide a separate estimation of the DDD 
model for large firms and for medium and small enterprises 
(SMEs). Again, some slight changes in the results appear. In 
particular, a positive effect of the first part of the law can be 
detected for large firms on both R&D expenditures and 
employment, but only for the period between the waves 7 and 8. 
On the other hand, a negative effect appears for SMEs on both 
expenditures and number of workers in R&D, but again limited to 
the first part of the Law and to the first period. The second part of 
the Law does not appear to have effects on either SMEs or large 
firms and both the second and the first part of the Law seem to 
have no effects whatsoever in the second period of observation 
(that is after the reform of 2001).  
It is worth noting that when considering the sub-sample of large 
firms, the effects of other R&D incentives also seem to loose some 
significance (in particular in the second period of observation), 
whereas they remain always positive and highly significant for 
SMEs. A further attempt to make the analysis deeper has been done 
taking into consideration if a firm is part of a group  or not16. The 
results are very similar to those already discussed with reference to 
large firms and SMEs. Firms that are part of a group display very 
similar results as large firms. This is easily explained since 80% of 
large firms are part of a group, whereas only 20% of SMEs are part 
of a group.  
We tried to go beyond an analysis of the aggregate effect of the 
law46/82 also by investigating the effects of the law in each of the 
four group of firms identified by the Pavitt taxonomy, running four 
distinct DDD regressions. Then, we crossed this distinction with 
that by firm size (small-medium firms, on one side; large firms, on 
the other). Crossing the four Pavitt groups with the two size groups, 
we obtained other eight sub-groups of firms and other eight DDD 
regressions. The results of all these twelve regressions are shown in 
                                                 
16 In the questionnaire submitted to the firms, a group is defined as a set of firms 
controlled –directly or indirectly- by the same persons, the same company or the same 
public institutions. 
Tables A.6-A.9. 
It is difficult to identify a sub-group of firms where the law46/82 
results with no doubt effective from all points of view (effect on 
both employers and expenditures in each of the considered 
periods); nevertheless, we may identify some interesting “partial” 
effects. In the large firms belonging to the first Pavitt group 
(supplier dominated) the second part of the law46/1982 (FIT) has a 
positive effect on the number of R&D employers in the second 
considered period. Even in the second Pavitt group (scale 
intensive), it is possible to find a positive effect of the law on the 
large firms; in this case the effect is on R&D expenditures by the 
first part of the law in the first of the considered periods; anyway, 
in this case it has to be observed the strong negative sign of the 
DDD coefficient, still underlining the negative effect of the 
interaction of our law with other incentives to R&D. In the third 
Pavitt group (specialised suppliers) the first part of the law had a 
significant effect, in the second considered period, both on 
expenditures and employers in R&D; differently from the first two 
categories, in this case the effect is concentrated on small-medium 
firms. Even in the fourth Pavitt group (science-based), where R&D 
is particularly important, there is a positive and significant effect of 
the law in the second period, exactly of both parts of the law on the 
employers in R&D (in the sub-group of SMEs this effect is 
confirmed only for the second part of the law). 
7.1 A territorial analysis 
Another dimension that has to be taken into consideration is the 
territorial one. This is particularly true in Italy, a country 
characterized by a persistent dualism between the rich and 
developed Northern part of the country and the less developed 
Southern part. In the South of Italy the weakness of several 
environmental and strictly economic factors may negatively affect 
the impact of the public subsidies; on the other side, the public 
intervention is particularly needed in a less developed context: it is 
exactly where the investment in R&D is poor that the public 
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subsidy may let to overcome the financial constraints and cause a 
significant boost in that kind of expenditure. We considered a 
division of national territory in four areas (North-West; North-East; 
Centre; South). First of all, it has to be observed that the South is 
significantly below the other three areas, very similar among them, 
in terms of expenditure and occupied in R&D; the size of the firms, 
expressed by the number of occupied, is on average smaller in 
Centre and South respect to the North East and North West. The 
DDD analysis shows that the other incentives to R&D but law 
46/1982 have an overall positive effect both on the expenditure and 
the employment in R&D in all the areas; on the contrary, between 
wave 7 and 8, the law 46/1982 never shows a significant positive 
effect; moreover, in many specifications it has a significant 
negative effect in the South of Italy, particularly if we consider the 
second part of the law; the interaction term is often negative and 
significant, too, indicating that the contemporary presence of the 
law46/1982 with other treatments gives particularly negative effect; 
the negative effect of the law 46/1982, taken alone and in 
interaction with other incentives, is often true for the Centre of 
Italy, too. It must be underlined the presence of some public 
subsidies specific for the South and other less developed part of the 
country: the interaction among laws with its negative effect may 
therefore happen, in the South, with such subsidies. It has also to be 
observed that the presence of some form of public incentives only 
in some part of the country makes it difficult to compare all the 
results for the different areas of Italy. Things seems slightly to 
change in the second considered period, as the law 46/1982, 
particularly the first part (FAR), if taken alone (without other 
incentives) has in the South of Italy (and only there) a positive 
effect on both expenditure and employment in R&D. In the light of 
the hypotheses formulated above on the possible effects of the 
public incentives in the less developed parts of the country, this 
results could be read as the prevalence of the negative effects of the 
context in the first period and the prevalence of the positive, 
“boosting” effect in the second period. As giving efficient 
incentives to the Southern Italy, increasing its technological level, 
is an historical policy priority in Italy, if this result will be 
confirmed by further studies, this may be considered a positive 
result of the re-organization of the public system of incentives to 
R&D.17 
8. Policy Conclusions 
In this paper we have recalled the importance of policy evaluation 
in the definition of industrial policy strategies, we have reviewed 
the theoretical reasons why government should support private 
expenses in R&D and reported the results of the main attempts to 
evaluate this kind of policies. Then we focused our attention on the 
Italian system of incentives to R&D and innovation, underlining 
the potential overlapping problems and analysing in particular the 
effects of a specific law - 46/1982 - with its subsequent 
transformation. We found that Law 46, and its distinction in two 
parts, does not seem to have any significant effect on the R&D 
expenses or employment of firms once other R&D incentives are at 
work. These results appear particularly discouraging if considered 
that the other R&D incentives appear, with few exceptions, positive 
and significant. Moreover, the Italian system of incentives to 
innovation seems to be plethoric, since the law under consideration 
seems to even reduce the strength of the other incentives.  
Nevertheless, these average results are in part mitigated if we take 
into consideration some distinctions inside the sample of firms. 
When large firms are analysed separately from SMEs some positive 
results emerge for large firms, while negative effects appear for 
small firms. However, these findings are not systematic and are 
only limited to the first period of observation. This could cast some 
doubts on the appropriateness of the re-organisation of FAR and 
FIT in 2001, since the analysis for the most recent periods (wave 8 
and 9 after the reform) never shows any signal of positive effect of 
the Law. Moreover, these results appear particularly discouraging if 
                                                 
17 The results concerning the territorial analysis, as well as those concerning the 
analysis the belonging or not to a group, may be obtained on request. 
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considered that the other R&D incentives appear, with few 
exceptions, positive and significant. Some positive signals about 
the effects of the Law46/82 after its re-organization in 2001 come 
from the analysis conducted by Pavitt group, as we find, in the 
second considered period (wave 8 and 9), some effect of FAR in 
the specialised-suppliers firms and of both FAR and FIT in the 
science-based firms. Even considering a territorial analysis, the 
only positive results come from the FAR in the second period in the 
South of Italy, surprisingly the same part of the country that 
registers the worst results of the law in the previous period. Two 
general warnings emerge therefore from our study. First of all, 
when a specific public intervention is adopted in presence of 
similar policies, there is a need to take explicitly into consideration 
the context, in order to be able to isolate the effects of the different 
policy instruments. This is important to formulate policy 
suggestions that can help avoid a useless overlapping of incentives. 
Besides, in the evaluation process there is a need to go beyond the 
use of mean effects, considering the sub-groups of the treated 
subject, given that the effects may different substantially across 
them: identifying the specific groups where the policy is effective 
may reduce the entity of public expenditure, increasing its 
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 Table A.1Variables: definitions and calculations. 
Dependent Variables  
R&D expenditures ln (1+ total R&D expenditures in the wave) 
R&D employment ln (1+ average number of workers in R&D in the wave)    
Time Variable  
Wave 
different meaning in different periods: 
Regressions in the Waves 7-8: =1 if the observation is in the VIII wave; = 0 if the observation is in the VII wave 
Regressions in the Waves 8-9: =1 if the observation is in the IX wave; = 0 if the observation is in the VIII wave 
 
Policy Variables  
Law46/82 
different meaning according to the different regressions: 
Regression Law 46/8-Wave 7-8: =1 if the firm receives incentives from any part of the law in the VIII wave; =0 otherwise 
Regression Law 46/ 8-Wave 8-9: = 1 if the firm receives incentives from any part of the law in the IX wave; =0 otherwise 
Regression Law 46/8-Part I -Wave 7-8: = 1 if the firm receives incentives from the first part of the law in the VIII wave; =0 otherwise 
Regression Law 46/8-Part I -Wave 8-9: = 1 if the firm receives incentives from the first part of the law in the IX wave; =0 otherwise 
Regression Law 46/8-Part II -Wave 7-8: = 1 if the firm receives incentives from the second part of the law in the VIII wave; =0 otherwise 
Regression Law 46/8-Part II -Wave 8-9: = 1 if the firm receives incentives from the second part of the law in the IX wave; =0 otherwise 
 
Other R&D incentives  
different meaning according to the different regressions: 
Regression Law 46/8-Wave 7-8: =1 if the firm receives other incentives but law46/82 in the VIII wave; =0 otherwise 
Regression Law 46/ 8-Wave 8-9: = 1 if the firm receives other incentives but law46/82 in the IX wave; =0 otherwise 
Regression Law 46/8-Part I -Wave 7-8: = 1 if the firm receives other incentives but the first part of the law46/82 in the VIII wave; =0 
otherwise 
Regression Law 46/8-Part I -Wave 8-9: = 1 if the firm receives other incentives but the first part of the law46/82 in the IX wave =0 
otherwise Regression Law 46/8-Part II -Wave 7-8: = 1 if the firm receives other incentives but the second part of the law46/82 in the VIII 
wave; =0 otherwise 
Regression Law 46/8-Part II -Wave 8-9: = 1 if the firm receives other incentives but the second part of the law46/82 in the IX wave; =0 
otherwise  
DDD Estimator Law46/82*Other R&D incentives  
Control Variables Zi 
Workers Average number of workers in the wave) 
Log_Sales ln (1 + total sales in the wave) 
Self-financing in R&D Amount of self-financed R&S expenditures in the wave 
Bank branches  Number of bank branches in the town of firm’s residence  
R&D Consortia  (= 1 if the firm is Part of an R&D Consortium; = 0 Otherwise)  
 
Table A.2 Difference -in-Differences. Effects of Law 46 (total, part I and part II). Waves 7-8 and 8-9. Dependent variables R&D expenditures (log) and R&D employment (log). Fixed-effect coefficients (standard errors in 
parenthesis).  
* Significance: * α < 5%; ** α < 1%; *** α < 
0,1% 
Hausman values of χ2 and significance. 
T-test values for the attrition variable 
NEXTWAVE and significance. 
 Law 46/82 Law 46/82 – Part I (FAR) Law 46/82 – Part II (FIT) 


























1,19*** 0.17*** 0,16 0.07** 1,30** 0.19*** 0,20 0.07** 1,25*** 0.17*** 0,17 0.06** 
(0,22) (0.03) (0,18) (0.02) (0,22) (0.03) (0,17) (0.02) (0,22) (0.03) (0,18) (0.02) 
Law 46/82 
2,10** 0,30** 0,76 0.11 2,27* 0.22 1,86 0.28 1,42 0.25* 0,52 0.14 
(0,69) (0,10) (0,56) (0.09) (1,06) (0.12) (1,39) (0.21) (0,76) (0.11) (0,55) (0.09) 
Log_Sales 
0,50 0.08 0,18 0.07 0,49 0.09 0,10 0.07 0,51 0.10 0,16 0.07 
(0,48) (0.06) (0,42) (0.05) (0,48) (0.06) (0,40) (0.05) (0,48) (0.06) (0,41) (0.05) 
Workers 
-0,00 0.00 -0,00 0.00 0,00 0.00 -0,00 0.00* -0,00 0.00 -0,00 0.00 
(0,01) (0.00) (0,00) (0.00) (0,00) (0.00) (0,00) (0.00) (0,00) (0.00) (0,00) (0.00) 
Self-financing 
in R&D 
0,01** 0.00** 0,02*** 0.00 0,01** 0.00* 0,02*** 0.00 0,01** 0.00** 0,01*** 0.00 
(0,00) (0.00) (0,00) (0.00) (0,00) (0.00) (0,00) (0.00) (0,00) (0.00) (0,00) (0.00) 
Bank branches  
-0,01 -0.00 0,01 0.00 -0,01 -0.00 0,01 0.00 -0,01 -0.00 0,01 0.00 
(0,01) (0.00) (0,01) (0.00) (0,01) (0.00) (0,0) (0.00) (0,01) (0.00) (0,01) (0.00) 
R&D Consortia  
0,64 -0.05 0,86 -0.06 0,66 -0.09 1,80 0.06 0,60 -0.05 0,80 -0.05 
(2,42) (0.20) (1,12) (0.23) (2,49) (0.19) (1,17) (0.17) (2,43) (0.20) (1,00) (0.21) 
_Costant 
-4,68 -1,04 0,68 -0,70 -4,79 -1,05 2,14 -0,64 -4,89 -1,23 1,23 -0,78 
(7,98) (2,65) (7,02) (1,78) (8,00) (2,66) (6,77) (1,72) (7,90) (2,69) (6,98) (1,78) 
Hausman test  
FE vs RE 24,62*** 65,98*** 36,24*** 60,86*** 17,87* 61,64*** 27,43*** 38,54*** 26,03*** 59,37*** 34,18*** 53,89*** 
NEXTWAVE 0,47 - 0,51 -0,24 -0,31 0,52 -0,26 -0,22 -0,29 0,59 -0,34 -0,23 -0,31 
N 7380 7153 7181 6892 7462 7232 7323 7024 7425 7197 7234 6936 
Adjusted R-squared  0,054 0,085 0,022 0,029 0,052 0,076 0,019 0,026 0.049 0,081 0,018 0,028 
Log likelihood -14221,5 1535,9 -14610 270,0 -14500 1514,8 -15000,4 95,13 -14356 1479,2 -14760,2 213,3 
Table A.3. Difference -in-Difference-in Difference (DDD). Effects of Law 46 (total, part I and part II). Waves 7-8 and 8-9. Dependent variables R&D expenditures (log) and R&D employment (log). Fixed-effect coefficients 
(standard errors in parenthesis).  
* Significance: * α < 5%; ** α < 1%; *** α < 0,1% 
Hausman values of χ2 and significance. 
T-test values for the attrition variable NEXTWAVE 
and significance. 
 Law 46/82 Law 46/82 – Part I (FAR) Law 46/82 – Part II (FIT) 

























Wave 0.87*** 0.12*** 0.10 0.06** 0,87*** 0,12*** 0,11 0,06** 0,87*** 0,12*** 0,11 0,06** 
 (0.23) (0.03) (0.19) (0.02) (0,23) (0,03) (0,20) (0,02) (0,23) (0,03) (0,19) (0,02) 
Law 46/82 0.37 0.16 0.41 0.12 0,41 0,27 2,58 -0,17 0,41 0,07 0,00 0,07 
 (1.01) (0.18) (0.93) (0.12) (0,71) (0,30) (4,66) (0,17) (1,30) (0,20) (0,93) (0,12) 
Other R&D 
incentives  
5.44*** 0.57*** 4.83*** 0.36*** 4,69*** 0,52*** 3,24*** 0,29*** 5,26*** 0,54*** 4,73*** 0,34*** 
(0.64) (0.09) (0.65) (0.08) (0,56) (0,08) (0,53) (0,07) (0,61) (0,09) (0,66) (0,08) 
DDD estimator -1.32 -0.14 -1.56 -0.09 -1,58 -0,34 -2,58 0,67 -1,64 0,05 -0,89 0,09 
(1.48) (0.24) (1.40) (0.24) (1,69) (0,34) (5,14) (0,48) (1,71) (0,26) (1,41) (0,24) 
Log_Sales 0.20 0.07 0.36 0.07 0,22 0,07 0,37 0,08 0,24 0,07 0,36 0,07 
(0.50) (0.06) (0.41) (0.05) (0,50) (0,06) (0,41) (0,05) (0,49) (0,06) (0,41) (0,05) 
Workers -0.00 0.00 -0.01* -0.00 -0,00 0,00 -0,01 -0,00 -0,00 0,00 -0,01* -0,00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Self-financing in 
R&D 
0.02*** 0.00*** 0.02*** 0.00* 0,02*** 0,00*** 0,02*** 0,00* 0,02*** 0,00*** 0,02*** 0,00* 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Bank branches  -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0,01 -0,00 0,01 0,00 -0,01 -0,00 0,01 0,00 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) 
R&D Consortia  1.54 -0.03 -1.61 -0.11 1,61 -0,03 -1,19* -0,09 1,52 -0,03 -1,58 -0,10 
(2.34) (0.15) (0.89) (0.37) (2,39) (0,15) (0,60) (0,36) (2,35) (0,16) (0,87) (0,37) 
_Costant -0.41 -0.75 -2.93 -0.83 -0,50 -0,75 -2,96 -0,86 -0,84 -0,78 -2,84 -0,83 
(8.23) (0.95) (6.86) (0.78) (8,22) (0,95) (6,98) (0,77) (8,21) (0,95) (6,86) (0,78) 
Hausman test FE vs 
RE 33,55*** 77,17*** 56,34*** 115,81*** 33,81*** 66,44*** 47,07*** 100,64*** 35,20*** 68,59*** 56,77*** 118,46*** 
NEXTWAVE 0,53 -0,24 -0,32 0,50 0,37 -0,37 -0,33 -0,35 0,44 -0,17 -0,32 -0,34 
N 7123 6904 6761 6519 7123 6904 6761 6519 7123 6904 6761 6519 
Adjusted R-squared  0.147 0.136 0.085 0.055 0,137 0,131 0,071 0,055 0,144 0,138 0,087 0,057 
Log likelihood -13113.3 1999.5 -13288.0 857.7 -13157,0 1978,1 -13341,8 857,7 -13126,2 2007,0 -13283,1 864,7
Table A.4. Difference -in-Difference-in Difference (DDD). Effects of Law 46 (total, part I and part II) for PMI firms. Waves 7-8 and 8-9. Dependent variables R&D expenditures (log) and R&D employment (log). Fixed-effect 
coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis).  
 
* Significance: * α < 5%; ** α < 1%; *** α < 0,1% 
Hausman values of χ2 and significance. 
T-test values for the attrition variable NEXTWAVE 
and significance. 
 Law 46/82 Law 46/82 – Part I (FAR) Law 46/82 – Part II (FIT) 

























Wave 0,78*** 0,12** 0,15 0,07*** 0,79*** 0,12*** 0,15 0,07** 0,78*** 0,12*** 0,15 0,07** 
 (-0,23) (-0,03) -0,19 -0,02 (0,23) (0,03) (0,19) (0,02) (0,23) (0,03) (0,19) (0,02) 
Law 46/82 0,25 0,10 1,16 0,09 -0,59* -0,11*** 2,46 -0,19 0,39 0,05 0,73 0,05 
 (-1,17) (-0,19) (1,04) (0,10) (0,23) (0,03) (4,63) (0,17) (1,37) (0,21) (1,02) (0,10) 
Other R&D 
incentives  
    5,17*** 0,49*** 4,92*** 0,34*** 4,70*** 0,45*** 3,70*** 0,26*** 4,97*** 0,46*** 4,80*** 0,31*** 
(-0,69) (-0,10) (0,67) (0,08) (0,61) (0,09) (0,56) (0,06) (0,66) (0,09) (0,68) (0,08) 
DDD estimator -0,33 -0,05 -2,12 -0,12 -1,69 -0,03 -2,23 0,62 -0,23 0,13 -1,16 0,04 
(-1,72) (-0,26) (1,60) (0,21) (1,71) (0,17) (5,25) (0,58) (1,90) (0,29) (1,61) (0,23) 
Log_Sales 0,33 0,09 -0,06 0,01 0,31 0,09 -0,04 0,01 0,34 0,09 -0,07 0,00 
(-0,48) (-0,06) (0,36) (0,04) (0,48) (0,06) (0,37) (0,04) (0,48) (0,06) (0,36) (0,04) 
Workers 0,05*** 0,00** 0,04** 0,01*** 0,05*** 0,01** 0,04** 0,01** 0,05*** 0,01** 0,04** 0,01*** 
(-0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) 
Self-financing in 
R&D 
0,01** 0,00* 0,02*** 0,00** 0,01** 0,00* 0,02*** 0,00** 0,01** 0,00* 0,02*** 0,00** 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Bank branches  0,01 0,00 0,02* 0,00 0,01 -0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,02* 0,00 
(-0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) 
R&D Consortia  1,44 0,02 -1,71 -0,11 1,40 0,00 -1,39 -0,09 1,45 0,03 -1,68 -0,10 
(-2,85) (-0,17) (0,99) (0,36) (2,88) (0,17) (0,77) (0,35) (2,87) (0,17) (0,97) (0,36) 
_Costant -5,58 -1,42 0,15 0,07*** -5,17 -1,40 0,70 -0,04 -5,78 -1,43 1,15 0,01 
(-7,80) (-1,01) (0,19) (0,02) (7,81) (1,01) (6,00) (0,68) (7,79) (1,01) (5,84) (0,68) 
Hausman test FE vs 
RE 29,73*** 56,63*** 38,51*** 108,38*** 33,20*** 55,89*** 33,00*** 89,92*** 28,96*** 50,31*** 38,30*** 110,71*** 
NEXTWAVE 0,06 0,06 0,33 0,33 0,03 0,03 0,32 0,32 0,05 0,05 0,33 0,33 
N 6554 6381 6206 6091 6554 6381 6206 6091 6554 6381 6206 6091 
Adjusted R-squared  0,17 0,16 0,094 0,073 0,156 0,156 0,084 0,072 0,163 0,163 0,095 0,074 
Log likelihood -11692,1 2751,7 -12159,7 1544,3 -11728,2 2732,8 -12192,9 1542,1 -11703,4 2758,6 -12155,6 1547,5
Table A.5. Difference -in-Difference-in Difference (DDD). Effects of Law 46 (total, part I and part II) for Big firms. Waves 7-8 and 8-9. Dependent variables R&D expenditures (log) and R&D employment (log). Fixed-effect 
coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis).  
* Significance: * α < 5%; ** α < 1%; *** α < 0,1% 
Hausman values of χ2 and significance. 






Tables A.6: Difference -in-Difference-in Difference 
(DDD). Effects of Law 46 (total, part I and part II) 
by Pavitt 1 classification and dimension. Waves 
7-8 and 8-9. Dependent variables R&D 
expenditures (log) and R&D employment (log). 
Fixed-effect coefficients.  
Only policy variables and significant (at 5%) 














 Law 46/82 Law 46/82 – Part I (FAR) Law 46/82 – Part II (FIT) 

























Wave 0,20 -0,01 -0,85 -0,18 0,20 -0,02 -0,89 -0,15 0,28 -0,01 -0,79 -0,15 
 (1,19) (0,22) (1,49) (0,34) (1,19) (0,22) (1,50) (0,35) (1,19) (0,22) (1,50) (0,34) 
Law 46/82 3,80 0,60 -2,62 -0,01 6,28* 1,17*** 0,37 0,24 0,44 0,04 -2,93 -0,34 
 (2,06) (0,45) (3,06) (0,94) (2,63) (0,22) (1,82) (0,63) (1,15) (0,22) (3,27) (1,13) 
Other R&D 
incentives  
7,15*** 1,39*** 2,21 0,99* 5,60*** 1,29*** 0,34 0,79 7,15*** 1,36*** 2,19 0,98* 
(1,87) (0,37) (1,41) (0,49) (1,63) (0,33) (1,96) (0,54) (1,69) (0,34) (1,41) (0,49) 
DDD estimator -6,01* -0,46 4,08 0,67 -4,56 -0,49   -3,67 0,12 3,71 0,83 
(2,90) (0,62) (3,07) (1,19) (3,94) (0,36)   (2,13) (0,45) (3,21) (1,27) 
Log_Sales -4,27 -0,11 -1,41 1,27 -3,96 -0,10 -1,53 1,24 -4,29 -0,10 -1,13 1,39 
(2,31) (0,11) (3,50) (0,84) (2,41) (0,11) (3,56) (0,82) (2,32) (0,11) (3,51) (0,86) 
Workers -0,00 -0,00 -0,01 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 -0,01 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 -0,01 -0,00 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) 
Self-financing in 
R&D 
0,06** 0,01** 0,03 -0,00 0,06** 0,01** 0,04 -0,00 0,06** 0,01** 0,03 -0,00 
(0,02) (0,00) (0,03) (0,01) (0,02) (0,00) (0,02) (0,01) (0,02) (0,00) (0,03) (0,01) 
Bank branches  -0,04 -0,01 0,02 0,01 -0,04 -0,01 0,01 0,00 -0,04 -0,01 0,01 0,00 
(0,02) (0,00) (0,02) (0,01) (0,02) (0,00) (0,02) (0,01) (0,02) (0,00) (0,02) (0,01) 
R&D Consortia  2,45 -0,93   2,97 -0,75   2,77 -0,91   
(3,53) (0,87)   (2,91) (0,82)   (3,73) (0,87)   
_Costant 93,38* 4,06 40,32 -22,40 87,22 3,83 42,71 -21,63 94,57* 3,98 35,96 -24,15 
(43,91) (2,36) (65,11) (15,05) (45,73) (2,36) (66,03) (14,65) (44,17) (2,33) (65,12) (15,30) 
Hausman test FE vs 
RE 18,62* 9,68 13,80 6,21 20,15* 8,39 15,02* 5,25 20,99* 9,83 14,37 6,37 
NEXTWAVE 0,88 0,88 0,05 0,05 0,75 0,75 0,04 0,04 0,67 0,67 0,05 0,05 
N 569 523 555 428 569 523 555 428 569 523 555 428 
Adjusted R-squared  0,236 0,228 0,213 0,111 0,229 0,222 0,182 0,084 0,248 0,232 0,213 0,118 
Log likelihood -1170,7 -146,7 -1037,9 -199,5 -1173,5 -148,8 -1049,3 -206,6 -1166,1 -145,3 -1038,1 -198,0
 
  Law 46/82 Law 46/82 – Part I (FAR) Law 46/82 – Part II (FIT) 






























            
Other R&D  





 -3,98*   -0.63* -8.01* 0.31**   -3.66*  








            
Other R&D  
incentives  6.68*** 0.64*** 5.58*** 0.36** 5.91*** 0.57*** 3.62*** 0.26** 6.26*** 0.61*** 5.61*** 0.33** 
DDD 
estimator   -4,32*  -5.74*** -0.66* -8.10* 0.35**   -3.96*  






   1.69***  NO  NO    1.69*** 
Other R&D  
incentives  8.91**    7.68*** 0.98*  1.56* 8.67***  5.61***  
DDD 
estimator    NO  NO  NO   -3.96* NO 
N 200 187 214 172 200 187 214 172 200 187 214 172 




Tables A.7: Difference -in-Difference-in Difference (DDD). Effects of Law 46 (total, part I and part II) by Pavitt 2 classification and dimension. Waves 7-8 and 8-9. Dependent variables R&D expenditures (log) and R&D 
employment (log). Fixed-effect coefficients.  
Only policy variables and significant (at 5%) coefficients are shown.  
  Law 46/82 Law 46/82 – Part I (FAR) Law 46/82 – Part II (FIT) 






























      -11.50*** -0.68***     
Other R&D  
incentives    5.12*** 0.27*   3.32***  3.72*  3.83*  
DDD 
estimator    1.24**   NO NO    1.27** 








  -6.16*    -11.69**      
Other R&D  
incentives   0.64*** 4.13** 0.36**  0.57***  0.26**  0.61**  0.33** 
DDD 
estimator   12.51*** 1.35***  -0.66* NO 0.35**   12.60***  






18.51***  8.09*** -1.41* 18.77*** NO NO    8.09*** -1.41* 
Other R&D  
incentives   1.85***  4.13***  1.57** 10.07***  7.96* 1.85**  4.13*** 
DDD 
estimator -19.56*** NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO NO NO 
N 166 155 126 95 166 155 126 95 166 155 126 95 
Significance: *α < 5%; ** α <1%; ***; α<0,1*** 
NO means that it has not been possible to estimate that coefficient; it has been reported only if, in the same regression, at least one of the other policy variables is significant. 
 
 
Tables A.8: Difference -in-Difference-in Difference (DDD). Effects of Law 46 (total, part I and part II) by Pavitt 3 classification and dimension. Waves 7-8 and 8-9. Dependent variables R&D expenditures (log) and R&D 
employment (log). Fixed-effect coefficients.  
Only policy variables and significant (at 5%) coefficients are shown.  
  Law 46/82 Law 46/82 – Part I (FAR) Law 46/82 – Part II (FIT) 






























      10.21*** 0.20*     
Other R&D  
incentives  4.54*** 0.36* 4.49*** 0.34* 4.52*** 0.44** 2.93** 0.32* 4.35*** 0.33* 4.67*** 0.33* 
DDD 
estimator      NO       








      10.83*** 0.16*     
Other R&D  
incentives  4.48*** 0.37* 4.90*** 0.37* 4.84*** 0.41** 4.65*** 0.29* 4.37*** 0.33* 5.08*** 0.36* 
DDD 
estimator     NO NO -8.82*      






  -15.99**    NO    -15.99**  
Other R&D  
incentives    -5.72*  4.05* 2.09* -10.28**  3.72*  -5.72*  
DDD 
estimator   21.93**  NO NO NO    21.93**  
N 159 143 166 126 159 143 166 126 159 143 166 126 
Significance: *α < 5%; ** α <1%; ***; α<0,1*** 
NO means that it has not been possible to estimate that coefficient; it has been reported only if, in the same regression, at least one of the other policy variables is significant 
 
 
Tables A.9: Difference -in-Difference-in Difference (DDD). Effects of Law 46 (total, part I and part II) by Pavitt 4 classification and dimension.  Waves 7-8 and 8-9. Dependent variables R&D expenditures (log) and R&D 
employment (log). Fixed-effect coefficients.  
Only policy variables and significant (at 5%) coefficients are shown.  
  Law 46/82 Law 46/82 – Part I (FAR) Law 46/82 – Part II (FIT) 






























 1.18***  0.81**    0.57**  -2.21**  0.59** 
Other R&D  
incentives     0.55**  1.13***    0.61*  0.56** 
DDD 
estimator  -2.15**  NO 12.48***   NO  NO   








 -2.43**  0.59***    NO  -2.43**  0.59*** 
Other R&D  
incentives     0.55**    0.56**    0.55** 
DDD 
estimator  NO  NO    NO  NO  NO 
N 309 302 260 260 309 302 260 260 309 302 260 260 
Significance: *α < 5%; ** α <1%; ***; α<0,1*** 
NO means that it has not been possible to estimate that coefficient; it has been reported only if, in the same regression, at least one of the other policy variables is significant 
It has not been possible to estimate the regressions for the big firms 
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